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Life After Morrison:
Extraterritorialityand RICO
ABSTRACT

For years, the federal courts of appeals have borrowed
heavily from securities law jurisprudence in developing a
framework for analyzing claims under the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt OrganizationsAct (RICO). Last year, in the case of
Morrison v. National Australia Bank, the Supreme Court issued
a ground-breakingopinion that rejected decades of lower court
precedent related to the extraterritorial application of U.S.
securities laws and reemphasized the vitality of the presumption
against extraterritoriality.Because of the parallel development
of securities law and RICO jurisprudence, Morrison will have
significant consequences for the application of RICO in cases
involving foreign defendants and criminal activity conducted
overseas. In the immediate wake of Morrison, two lower courts
issued opinions with differing interpretationsof how to analyze
extraterritorialityin the RICO context. This Note considers the
evolution of judicial treatment of extraterritoriality in the
securities law context, the fundamental principles of RICO
jurisprudence,and the historicalRICO jurisprudenceregarding
extraterritoriality.This Note then discusses the two approaches
taken by the lower courts in light of Morrison before ultimately
endorsing a third approach, which is both more doctrinally
sound and more practicallyworkable.
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I. INTRODUCTION

In light of the United States Supreme Court's recent decision in
Morrison v. National Australia Bank,' lower courts have begun to
reevaluate how they handle issues of extraterritorial application of
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). 2
Morrison arose under federal securities law,3 but for decades courts
have borrowed from securities law jurisprudence to address
extraterritoriality issues under RICO. 4 After Morrison dramatically
altered the jurisprudential landscape of extraterritoriality and the
securities laws, 5 courts must now reconsider the extraterritorial
reach of RICO.
In Morrison, the Supreme Court rejected decades of lower court
precedent to hold that courts must look to where the relevant
transaction occurred to determine whether a securities fraud claim
could be brought in the United States under § 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act).6 Morrison involved a securities
fraud claim brought against an Australian bank in connection with

Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank, 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010).
1.
See Norex Petrol. Ltd. v. Access Indus. Inc., 631 F.3d 29 (2d Cir. 2010) (per
2.
curiam) (holding that the question raised is whether a U.S. federal court can provide
relief, not whether there is subject matter jurisdiction); Cedefio v. Intech Grp., Inc., 733
F. Supp. 2d 471, 473 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) ("[N]owhere does the statute evidence any
concern with foreign enterprises, let alone a concern sufficiently clear to overcome the
presumption against extraterritoriality."). RICO is codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968
(2006).
Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2884.
3.
4.
See, e.g., N. S. Fin. Corp. v. Al-Turki, 100 F.3d 1046, 1051 (2d Cir. 1996)
("Although there is little caselaw in this Circuit regarding . the extraterritorial
application of RICO, guidance is furnished by precedents concerning subject matter
jurisdiction for international securities transactions and antitrust matters.").
See infra Part II.B.
5.
Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2884. Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act is
6.
codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006).
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its mortgage servicing operations in the United States.7 The bank's

stock was not traded on U.S. exchanges. 8 The Court held that § 10(b)
did not provide a cause of action "to foreign plaintiffs suing foreign
and American defendants for misconduct in connection with
securities traded on foreign exchanges."9 The Court emphasized that
absent "the affirmative intention of the Congress clearly expressed" to
give a statute extraterritorial effect, courts must presume that
legislation "is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of
the United States."' 0 The Court was careful to clarify that the claim
in Morrison was not jurisdictionally barred but simply failed to state
a claim under § 10(b) because the statute applies only to transactions
in securities listed on domestic exchanges and domestic transactions
in other securities.1 1
The Morrison decision has important implications beyond the
§ 10(b) context. The Court's revitalization of the presumption against
extraterritoriality will reverberate through established jurisprudence
applying RICO. Courts have used the same conduct and effects test
that was rejected in Morrison to apply RICO to extraterritorial
activity.12 Because lower courts have already held that the text of the
RICO statute does not contemplate extraterritorial application, 13
Morrison would seem to dictate that RICO does not create a cause of
action arising out of extraterritorial activity.1 4 In fact, the Second
Circuit recently relied on Morrison in dismissing a RICO claim filed
by a Canadian shareholder in a Russian oil company against foreign
persons and entities.'6
The Supreme Court's recent rejection of the conduct and effects
tests in favor of a "transactional" test in the § 10(b) context raises the

7.

Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2875-76.

Id. at 2875.
8.
Id. at 2875, 2883.
9.
10.
Id. at 2877.
11.
Id. at 2877, 2884.
See Liquidation Comm'n of Banco Intercont'l, S.A. v. Alvarez Renta, 530
12.
F.3d 1339, 1351-52 (11th Cir. 2008) (adopting the "widely accepted view ... that RICO
may apply extraterritorially if conduct material to the completion of the racketeering
occurs in the United States, or if significant effects of the racketeering are felt here");
see also Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2878-81 (endorsing adherence to the presumption
against extraterritoriality in all cases, rather than engaging in the Second Circuit's
individualized conduct and effects analysis in each case).
Poulos v. Caesars World, Inc., 379 F.3d 654, 663 (9th Cir. 2004) ("RICO
13.
itself is silent as to its extraterritorial application."); N. S. Fin. Corp. v. Al-Turki, 100
F.3d 1046, 1051 (2d Cir. 1996) ("The RICO statute is silent as to any extraterritorial
application.").
See Norex Petrol. Ltd. v. Access Indus., Inc., 631 F.3d 29, 31 (2d Cir. 2010)
14.
(per curiam) (affirming the district court's dismissal of the RICO claim on the grounds
that RICO does not apply extraterritorially because the statute is silent on the matter);
Cedefio v. Intech Grp., Inc., 733 F. Supp. 2d 471, 473 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) C[N]owhere does
the statute evidence any concern with foreign enterprises, let alone a concern
sufficiently clear to overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality.").
Norex, 631 F.3d at 31.
15.
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question of how to define extraterritoriality in RICO cases.16 The
Court reinvigorated the presumption against extraterritoriality in
Morrison, but the threshold issue in a RICO case involving
extraterritorial conduct is whether the claim seeks extraterritorial, or
merely domestic, application in the first place. The transaction in a
§ 10(b) case is a discrete event, and courts can readily determine
where the transaction occurred. In RICO cases, however, by
definition, the underlying activity giving rise to the plaintiffs claim is
a series of events-specifically, a "pattern of racketeering activity."' 7
In Norex Petroleum Ltd. v. Access Industries Inc., the first postMorrison decision by an appellate court to address extraterritoriality
and RICO, the Second Circuit was dismissive of the allegation that
some of the alleged RICO violations occurred in the United States,
stating that "simply alleging that some domestic conduct occurred
cannot support a claim of domestic application."' 8 It is not clear that
Morrison dictates such a result in the RICO context, however; in fact,
courts should embrace a more practical approach in considering the
reach of RICO's domestic application. While there is language in the
Morrison opinion suggesting that certain contacts with the United
States will exist in many, if not all, cases of extraterritorial
application of the securities laws, 19 extraterritoriality in the RICO
context requires some separate consideration due to the very different
nature of the activity prohibited by RICO.
This Note explores the development of judicial doctrine in the
extraterritorial application of securities laws and of the RICO statute.
This Note ultimately considers three alternative views of
extraterritoriality and RICO under the new Morrison paradigm. One
approach to defining extraterritoriality in the RICO context, evident
in a recent decision from the Southern District of New York, would
apply RICO to domestic enterprises, but not to foreign enterprises.2 0
A second approach, seemingly endorsed by the Second Circuit, would
determine the applicability of RICO based on whether a substantial
part of the alleged racketeering scheme, viewed as one cohesive unit,
took place in the United States.2 i Based on a more plain reading of
the statute and a more practical view of what constitutes domestic

See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2888 (Stevens, J., concurring) (rejecting the
16.
conduct and effects test).
17.
18 U.S.C. §§ 1961(5), 1962(85) (2006).
18.
Norex, 631 F.3d at 33.
19.
Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2884 ("For it is a rare case of prohibited
extraterritorial application that lacks all contact with the territory of the United
States.").
20.
See Cedefio v. Intech Grp., Inc., 733 F. Supp. 2d 471, 473 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)
("But nowhere does the statute evidence any concern with foreign enterprises, let alone
a concern sufficiently clear to overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality.").
21.
See Norex, 631 F.3d at 33 ("The slim contacts with the United States
alleged by Norex are insufficient to support extraterritorial application of the RICO
statute.").
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application, this Note endorses a third approach, which would apply
RICO domestically in any case where a plaintiff alleges that at least
two acts of racketeering activity (that otherwise satisfy RICO's
"pattern" requirement)22 occurred in the United States within a tenyear time period. 2 3

II. THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
In 1934, Congress enacted the Securities Exchange Act, which
includes the now ubiquitous anti-fraud provision of § 10(b), to
regulate aftermarket securities trading. 24 Because the federal courts
would ultimately model their approach to extraterritoriality and
RICO on the analogous securities law jurisprudence, it is necessary to
examine briefly the development of that § 10(b) extraterritoriality
jurisprudence, culminating in the recent Morrison decision.

A. Pre-Morrison: Extraterritorialityand the Exchange Act of 1934
For at least the last fifty years, federal courts have wrestled with
the application of the Securities Exchange Act to international
securities transactions.25 "It is a longstanding principle of American
law that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is
meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States." 26 Early international securities cases recognized the
legislative silence concerning extraterritorial application of the
Exchange Act, and § 10(b) claims "were thought to be available only
to investors defrauded in transactions conducted within the
territorial limits of this country."27
In 1967, the Second Circuit took "an important first step" in
expanding the extraterritorial reach of § 10(b) in Schoenbaum v.
Firstbrook.2 8 Schoenbaum involved the sale in Canada of a Canadian

22.
See infra text accompanying notes 73-102 (discussing the pattern
requirement).
23.
See infra Part V (outlining this Note's proposal).
15 U.S.C. § 78b (2006).
24.
25.
See John F. Zimmerman, Jr., Extra TerritorialApplication of Section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5, 34 OHIO ST. L.J. 342, 342 (1973) (citing cases as early as 1960 in
discussion of the early § 10(b) jurisprudence related to extraterritorial application).
26.
Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244,
248 (1991) (quoting in part Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
27.
Id.; see also Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank, 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2878 (2010) ("As
of 1967, district courts at least in the Southern District of New York had consistently
concluded that, by reason of the presumption against extraterritoriality, § 10(b) did not
apply when the stock transactions underlying the violation occurred abroad." (citations
omitted)).
28.
Zimmerman, supra note 25, at 342.
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corporation's treasury stock to other foreign entities. 29 The
corporation's common stock was traded on both the American Stock
Exchange and the Toronto Stock Exchange.30 Despite the fact that
the statute was silent as to extraterritorial application, the court
discerned that "Congress intended the Exchange Act to have
extraterritorial application in order to protect domestic investors who
have purchased foreign securities on American exchanges and to
protect the domestic securities market from the effects of improper
foreign transactions in American securities."3 1 The court held that
§ 10(b) applied to foreign securities transactions "at least when the
transactions involve stock registered and listed on a national
securities exchange, and are detrimental to the interests of American
investors." 32
Five years later, the Second Circuit further expanded the
extraterritorial reach of § 10(b) in Leasco Data ProcessingEquipment
Corp. v. Maxwell.3 3 Leasco involved a stock purchase made by a
foreign subsidiary of an American entity on the London Stock
Exchange. 34 While seeking to be acquired by Leasco, the defendant
British corporation made a series of false and misleading statements
and disclosures to Leasco, a number of which occurred in the United
States, by telephone with at least one party in the United States, or
by mail delivered to the United States.3 5 At the urging of, and upon
false information provided by, the defendants, Leasco purchased a
substantial number of shares of the defendant corporation on the
London Stock Exchange. 36 The court held that, even though the
transactions occurred in England, the fact that substantial
misrepresentations were made in the United States "tips the scales in
favor of applicability."3 7
Having laid the groundwork in Schoenbaum and Leasco, the
Second Circuit continued to develop its jurisprudential approach to
determining when § 10(b) had extraterritorial effect. Soon after
Leasco, the court directed that, in a case revolving around

Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 204-05 (2d Cir. 1967).
29.
Id. at 204.
30.
Id. at 206.
31.
32.
Id. at 208. The court explained that the "impairment of the value of
American investments by sales by the issuer in a foreign country" has "a sufficiently
serious effect upon United States commerce to warrant [application of the statute] for
the protection of American investors." Id. at 208-09. The Second Circuit analyzed this
extraterritorial application as a question of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 208. The
Supreme Court in Morrison expressly rejected this analysis, holding that the proper
inquiry as to extraterritorial application was whether the plaintiff stated a claim to
relief under § 10(b). Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877.
Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2878.
33.
34.
Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1330-33
(2d Cir. 1972).
Id.
35.
Id. at 1332.
36.
37.
Id. at 1337.
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"predominantly foreign" transactions, courts "must seek to determine
whether Congress would have wished the precious resources of
United States courts and law enforcement agencies to be devoted to
38
them rather than [to] leave the problem to foreign countries." Under
this guidance, the court "consistently looked at two factors: (1)
whether the wrongful conduct occurred in the United States [i.e., the
'conduct test'], and (2) whether the wrongful conduct had a
substantial effect in the United States or upon United States citizens
[i.e., the 'effects test']."
Each of these tests had developed certain guiding principles. The
conduct test ultimately provided that a federal court had jurisdiction
over foreign securities transactions "if (1) the defendant's activities in
the United States were more than 'merely preparatory' to a securities
fraud conducted elsewhere, and (2) these activities or culpable
failures to act within the United States 'directly caused' the claimed
losses."4 0 The effects test, as characterized in Leasco, provided that
U.S. courts had jurisdiction over foreign securities transactions if
fraudulent conduct outside the United States caused an effect in U.S.
4
territory (e.g., a detrimental effect on American investors). ' The
court declined to analyze the conduct and effects factors "separately
and distinctly," however, instead employing "an admixture or
combination of the two" to determine "whether there [was] sufficient
United States involvement to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by an
American court." 42
The Second Circuit's approach was widely influential among the
federal circuit courts, even though courts' specific decisional
mechanics varied from circuit to circuit. 43 The D.C. Circuit's
deference to the Second Circuit's approach, despite expressing
dissatisfaction with the appropriateness of the conduct and effects
analysis, is emblematic of the influence that the Second Circuit has
had in § 10(b) extraterritoriality jurisprudence. 44 Prior to the

Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 985 (2d Cir. 1975).
38.
Sec. Exch. Comm'n v. Berger, 322 F.3d 187, 192-93 (2d Cir. 2003).
39.
Itoba Ltd. v. LEP Grp. PLC, 54 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 1995) (citation
40.
omitted); Alfadda v. Fenn, 935 F.2d 475, 478 (2d Cir. 1991) (citations omitted). For a
discussion of the ambiguity and complexity existing in the "conduct test" jurisprudence,
see Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank, 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2879 (2010).
Leasco DataProcessing,468 F.2d at 1333-34.
41.
Itoba, 54 F.3d at 122.
42.
See, e.g., Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2880 (citing Sec. Exch. Comm'n v. Kasser,
43.
548 F.2d 109, 116 (3d Cir. 1977)); Continental Grain (AustI.) Pty. Ltd. v. Pac. Oilseeds,
Inc., 592 F.2d 409, 421-22 (8th Cir. 1979) (agreeing with policy rationales of the Third
Circuit in Kasser); see also Grunenthal GmbH v. Hotz, 712 F.2d 421, 424-25 (9th Cir.
1983) (following the test set forth by the Eighth and Third Circuits); see also Kauthar
SDN BHD v. Sternberg, 149 F.3d 659, 667 (7th Cir. 1998) (identifying the same midground as the Second and Fifth Circuits).
See Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 32 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
44.
(deferring to the Second Circuit's approach because of "the Second Circuit's
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Morrison decision, what had emerged from these cases was a nationwide amalgam of "vaguely related variations on the 'conduct' and
'effects' tests."45
B. The Decision in Morrison
The Morrison case involved Australian shareholders suing an
Australian bank, its Florida-based subsidiary, and officers of both
companies for violation of several provisions of the 1934 Act,
including § 10(b). 4 6 The Morrison plaintiffs had purchased shares of
Australian National Bank (National) on foreign exchanges. 4 7
In 1998, National purchased HomeSide Lending, Inc.
(HomeSide), a Florida mortgage servicing company. 48 As part of its
mortgage servicing business, HomeSide received fees for collecting
mortgage payments. 9 The rights to receive these fees represent "a
valuable income stream" to a company like HomeSide, and the value
of these rights "depends, in part, on the likelihood that the mortgage
to which it applies will be fully repaid before it is due, terminating
the need for servicing."5 0 HomeSide calculated the present value of
these mortgage-servicing rights, and these figures then appeared in
National's financial statements, which "touted the success of
HomeSide's business" from 1998 through 2001.5 But in July 2001,
National announced a $450 million write-down of HomeSide's assets,
and less than two months later, National announced that it was
writing down the value of HomeSide's assets by another $1.75
billion. 52
The Morrison plaintiffs had purchased National's shares in 2000
and 2001, prior to the write-downs.53 In the litigation, they alleged
that the defendants had "manipulated HomeSide's financial models to
make the rates of early repayment unrealistically low in order to
cause the mortgage-servicing rights to appear more valuable than
they really were." 54 Because the alleged manipulation of HomeSide's
models occurred in Florida and several allegedly misleading public
statements were made in Florida, the plaintiffs argued that they
sought "no more than domestic application" of § 10(b). 5 5

preeminence in the field of securities law, and our desire to avoid a multiplicity of
jurisdictional tests").
45.
Id.
46.
Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2875-76.
47.
Id. at 2875.
Id.
48.

49.

Id.

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 2875-76.
Id. at 2576.
Id.
Id. at 2883.
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Applying the conduct and effects test, the district court ruled
that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the acts in the
United States were, "at most, a link in the chain of an alleged overall
securities fraud scheme that culminated abroad." 56 The Second
Circuit affirmed, noting that "[t]he acts performed in the United
States did not 'compris[e] the heart of the alleged fraud."'5 7
The Supreme Court first clarified that the analysis of
extraterritorial application of § 10(b) was a merits question under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), rather than a jurisdictional
question under Rule 12(b)(1). 5 8 The Court went on to hold that absent
a clear statement by Congress that § 10(b) was to apply
extraterritorially, courts should only apply the statute within the
territorial borders of the United States.5 9 In drawing the line between
domestic and extraterritorial application of § 10(b), the Court rejected
the conduct and effects test, holding that "the focus of the Exchange
Act is not upon the place where the deception originated, but upon
purchases and sales of securities in the United States." 60
Emphasizing this "focus of the Exchange Act," the Court held that the
location of the purchase and sale of the security determines whether
a particular case involves domestic or extraterritorial applicationi.e., § 10(b) only applies to "transactions in securities listed on
domestic exchanges, and domestic transactions in other securities."Gi
III. THE RACKETEERING

INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT

ORGANIZATIONS ACT

A. The RICO Statute
In 1970, Congress enacted the Racketeering Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) 62 to prohibit patterns of
racketeering activity in or affecting commerce, particularly in the
form of organized crime. 63 All RICO claims have at least two common
elements: an "enterprise" and a "pattern of racketeering activity."6
Specifically, RICO prohibits any person from (1) using any income
derived from a pattern of racketeering activity to invest in any
56.
In re Nat'1 Austl. Bank Sec. Litig., No. 03 Civ. 6537 (BSJ), 2006 WL
3844465, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 2006).
57.
Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2876 (second alteration in original) (quoting
Morrison v. Nat'1 Austl. Bank, 547 F.3d 167, 175-76 (2d Cir. 2008)).
58.
Id. at 2877.
59.
Id. at 2877, 2888.
Id. at 2884.
60.
Id.
61.
62.
Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§
1961-1969 (2006).
63.
United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351, 1358 (7th Cir. 1974).
64.
18 U.S.C. § 1962.
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enterprise engaged in, or affecting, interstate or foreign commerce; 65
(2) acquiring, through a pattern of racketeering activity, any interest
in any enterprise engaged in, or affecting, interstate or foreign
commerce; 66 (3) participating, through a pattern of racketeering
activity, in the conduct of the affairs of any enterprise engaged in, or
affecting, interstate or foreign commerce; 67 or (4) conspiring to violate
any of the previous three provisions. 68
The statute defines an "enterprise" as including "any individual,
partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any
union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal
entity."69 Consistent with the inclusiveness of the statutory language,
the courts have construed the enterprise requirement very broadly. 70
The RICO statute meticulously defines "racketeering activity."7 '
"Racketeering activity" includes a broad range of federal crimes and
other serious crimes, including bribery, counterfeiting, mail fraud,
wire fraud, obstruction of justice, the interstate transportation of
stolen property, the sale of stolen goods, bankruptcy fraud, fraud in
the sale of securities, and extortion.72
Congress was more ambiguous as to the meaning of a "pattern"
of racketeering activity. Under the statute, a "pattern of racketeering
activity" consists of "at least two acts of racketeering activity"
committed within a ten-year time period.7 3 As innocuous as the
statutory language sounds, disputes over the meaning of the pattern
requirement have "dominated civil RICO litigation" since at least
1985. 74 The meaning of the "pattern of racketeering activity"
requirement has significant implications in demarcating the line
between domestic and extraterritorial applications of RICO.75
The 'pattern of racketeering activity' requirement came to
prominence" in 1985 in the Supreme Court's opinion in Sedima,

Id. § 1962(a).
65.
66.
Id. § 1962(b).
67.
Id. § 1962(c).
68.
Id. § 1962(d).
Id. § 1961(4).
69.
See, e.g., United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580-81 (1981) (including
70.
legitimate and illegitimate enterprises within the scope of § 1962); United States v.
Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351, 1358 (7th Cir. 1974) (finding that Congress intended the
meaning of "enterprise" to be interpreted broadly).
See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (setting forth the detailed meaning of "racketeering
71.
activity" in the statute).
Id.
72.
73.
Id. § 1961(5).
74.
Gregory M. Wasson, "Patternof Racketeering Activity" Under the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt OrganizationsAct (RICO), 10 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D
289, § 5 (2010).
75.
See infra Part V (arguing that RICO should have domestic application
whenever there exists enough of a pattern of racketeering activity in the United States
to state a claim).

2011]

LIFEAFTER MORRISON: EXTRA TERRITORIAUTYAND RICO

1395

S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co. 76 While RICO was primarily intended to
"provid[e] litigants with a potent new weapon to use against
organized crime,"7 7 private parties had begun exploiting the civil
remedies available under RICO, with the result that RICO was
"evolving into something quite different from the original conception
of its enactors."7 8 Sedima presented an ideal case in which the Court
could limit the civil application of RICO because it merely involved
allegations of simple commercial fraud:79
In 1979, petitioner Sedima, a Belgian corporation, entered into a joint
venture with respondent Imrex Co. to provide electronic components to
a Belgian firm. The buyer was to order parts through Sedima; Imrex
was to obtain the parts in this country and ship them to Europe. The
agreement called for Sedima and Imrex to split the net proceeds. Imrex
filled roughly $8 million in orders placed with it through Sedima.
Sedima became convinced, however, that Imrex was presenting inflated
bills, cheating Sedima out of a portion of its proceeds by collecting for
nonexistent expenses.80

The district court dismissed Sedima's suit for failure to state a
claim, holding that a RICO plaintiff must allege some "racketeering
injury" independent of the injury caused by the individual predicate
acts.81 The Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal for failure to allege
a racketeering injury. 82 The appellate court also stated a second
ground for dismissing the complaint, holding that the complaint was
"defective for not alleging that the defendants had already been
criminally convicted of the predicate acts of mail and wire fraud, or of
a RICO violation."83
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that RICO does not
require a separate "racketeering injury" and that criminal conviction
for the predicate offenses is not a prerequisite to bringing a civil
RICO action, 84 but the greater significance of the opinion for the
"pattern of racketeering activity" requirement lies in a single
footnote.85 Writing for the Court, Justice White noted in footnote 14
that:
[T]he definition of a "pattern of racketeering activity" differs from the
other provisions in § 1961 in that it states that a pattern "requires at
least two acts of racketeering activity," not that it "means" two such
acts. The implication is that while two acts are necessary, they may not

76.

Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1985); Wasson, supra note 74,

§ 5.
77.
Ethan M. Posner, Clarifying a "Pattern" of Confusion: A Multi-Factor
Approach to Civil RICO's Pattern Requirement, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1745, 1745 (1988).
78.
Sedima, 473 U.S. at 500.
79.
Wasson, supra note 74, § 5.
Sedima, 473 U.S. at 483-84.
80.
81.
Id. at 484.
Id. at 484-85.
82.
Id. at 485.
83.
Id. at 500.
84.
Wasson, supra note 74, § 5.
85.
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be sufficient. Indeed, in common parlance two of anything do not
86
generally form a "pattern."

Justice White also cited RICO's legislative history, which, he
determined, "supports the view that two isolated acts of racketeering
activity do not constitute a pattern."8 7 Justice White quoted from the
Senate Report: "The target of [RICO] is thus not sporadic activity.
The infiltration of legitimate business normally requires more than
one racketeering activity and the threat of continuing activity to be
effective. It is this factor of continuity plus relationship which
combines to produce a pattern."88
While the Sedima decision brought the "pattern of racketeering
activity" requirement to the forefront by suggesting that a "pattern"
requires "continuity plus relationship," the Court did not actually
offer much in the way of specific guidance.8 9 In the years following
the Sedima decision, federal courts formulated a number of different
tests for determining what constitutes a "pattern of racketeering
activity."9 0 The "relationship" prong of the pattern requirement has
been largely uncontroversial in the lower courts. 9' However, prior to
1989, the courts came up with a number of different approaches to
the "continuity" prong of the pattern analysis. 92
In 1989 the Supreme Court confronted the pattern requirement
in H.J., Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co. 9 3 The case involved
allegations by Northwestern Bell customers that Northwestern Bell
had
sought to influence members of the [Minnesota Public Utilities
Commission (MPUC)] in the performance of their duties-and in fact
caused them to approve rates for the company in excess of a fair and
reasonable amount-by making cash payments to commissioners,
negotiating with them regarding future employment, and paying for

86.
Sedima, 473 U.S. at 497 n.14 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (2006)).
87.
Id.
88.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing S. REP. NO. 91-617, at 158
(1969)).
89.
See Wasson, supra note 74, § 5 (noting that footnote fourteen did not
constitute a holding in the opinion, but that it opened the door for lower courts to begin
developing various tests to determine whether a pattern existed).
90.
Id. § 6.
91.
Id. Generally, courts "have adopted similar multifactor tests, examining the
circumstances of each case to determine whether the predicate acts share similar
purposes, results, participants, victims, and methods of commission, and requiring that
the predicate acts be committed somewhat closely in time to one another, involve the
same victim, or involve the same kind of misconduct." Id.
92.
Id. The four tests that emerged in the wake of Sedima are generally known
as the "multiple schemes," the "multiple episodes," the "multiple acts," and the
"multiple factors" (case-by-case) approaches, respectively. See Patrick J. Ryan, The
Civil RICO PatternRequirement: Continuity and Relationship, a FatalAttraction?, 56
FORDHAM L. REV. 955, 965-66 (1988) (explaining the emergence of four views of the
pattern requirement).
93.
H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229 (1989).
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parties and meals, for tickets to sporting events and the like, and for
94
airline tickets.

The federal district court dismissed the complaint because "[elach of
the fraudulent acts alleged by [petitioners] was committed in
furtherance of a single scheme to influence MPUC commissioners to
the detriment of Northwestern Bell's ratepayers." 9- The Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, "confirming that under Eighth
Circuit precedent [a] single fraudulent effort or scheme is insufficient
to establish a pattern of racketeering activity, and agreeing with the
District Court that petitioners' complaint alleged only a single
scheme."96
The Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit in H.J., holding
that "although proof that a RICO defendant has been involved in
multiple criminal schemes would certainly be highly relevant to the
inquiry into the continuity of the defendant's racketeering activity, it
is implausible to suppose that Congress thought continuity might be
shown only by proof of multiple schemes."9 7 In addition to rejecting
outright the position taken by some lower courts that continuity be
demonstrated by proof of multiple criminal schemes (i.e., the
"multiple schemes" approach), the Court also rejected a simplistic test
that would require only two racketeering acts in order to find a
pattern (i.e., the "multiple acts" approach).9 8 The Court held that the
language of § 1961(5) merely sets a minimum standard of "at least
two acts of racketeering activity," and that the RICO statute
"assumes that there is something to a RICO pattern beyond simply
the number of predicate acts involved."99
Declaring that Congress intended the courts to "take a flexible
approach" in identifying "patterns" of racketeering activity, the Court
held that "a plaintiff or prosecutor must prove . . . continuity of
racketeering activity, or its threat." 100 While acknowledging the

difficulty of formulating any one general test, the Court elaborated
that continuity could be either a closed or open-ended concept. In a
closed-ended case, a plaintiff can demonstrate continuity by showing
the commission of predicate acts over "a substantial period of time";
in an open-ended case, a plaintiff can demonstrate continuity by
showing the commission of predicate acts over a shorter period of
time if the threat of continuity still exists.10 1

94.

Id. at 233.

H.J., Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 648 F. Supp. 419, 425 (D. Minn. 1986), aff'd,
95.
829 F.2d 648 (8th Cir. 1987), rev'd, 429 U.S. 229 (1989).
H.J., 492 U.S. at 234-35 (alteration in original) (citations and internal
96.
quotation marks omitted).
97.
Id. at 240.
98.
Id. at 237-38.

99.

Id.

100.
101.

Id. at 238, 241.
Id.
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In the wake of the H.J. decision, the various lower courts have
abandoned the "multiple schemes" approach altogether, altered the
"multiple acts" approach to require relatedness and continuity, and
continued to support some form of a multi-factor analysis.102 In sum,
while the Supreme Court has endorsed a "flexible" approach to the
statute's pattern requirement, RICO essentially provides a cause of
action for a plaintiff who can demonstrate that a defendant, in
connection with an enterprise, has engaged in continued criminal
activity or is engaging in criminal activity that threatens to become
"continuous."
B. Extraterritorialityand RICO: Pre-MorrisonJurisprudence
Like § 10(b) in the securities law context, the RICO statute is
silent as to any extraterritorial application. 103 In light of this
legislative silence, some courts have concluded that RICO does not
apply extraterritorially at all.104 The approach that a majority of
courts had taken prior to Morrison, however, was to apply essentially
the same conduct and effects test that they used in the § 10(b) context
to determine whether subject matter jurisdiction existed. 0 5 Under

102.
Wasson, supra note 74, §§ 12-14. For example, in Atlas Pile Driving Co. v.
DiCon Financial Co., the Eighth Circuit recognized that the Supreme Court had
rejected the "multiple schemes" approach and employed a multi-factor analysis. Atlas
Pile Driving Co. v. DiCon Fin. Co., 886 F.2d 986, 993-94 (8th Cir. 1989). The Second,
Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have all tightened up the requirements under the socalled "multiple acts" approach to demand something more than simply two predicate
acts. Wasson, supra note 74, § 13. Those courts have read H.J. to require some kind of
long-term continuity in addition to multiple predicate acts. Id. Several circuits have
reached different conclusions regarding the "multiple factor" approach. The Seventh
Circuit has upheld its multi-factor approach as in keeping with H.J. See Mgmt.
Computer Servs., Inc. v. Hawkins, Ash, Baptie & Co., 883 F.2d 48, 51 (7th Cir. 1989).
The Third Circuit has issued contradictory opinions alternately upholding its multifactor analysis as consistent with H.J., and supporting a multi-factor approach but
repudiating its own formulation of the relevant factors. See Shearin v. E.F. Hutton
Grp., Inc., 885 F.2d 1162, 1166 (3d. Cir. 1989) (stating that, in H.J., the Supreme Court
had "developed the inquiry to include a multifactor approach"); Swistock v. Jones, 884
F.2d 755, 757-58 (3d. Cir. 1989) (supporting a multi-factor approach but repudiating
the Third Circuit's formulation of relevant factors). The First Circuit has apparently
abandoned the "multiple factors" approach in favor of a "bifurcated framework for
determining continuity," holding that "[a] party may establish continuity by
demonstrating that the predicate acts amount to continued criminal activity . .. [or] by
demonstrating that the predicate acts, though not continuous, threaten to become so."
Fleet Credit Corp. v. Sion, 893 F.2d 441, 446 (1st Cir. 1990).
103.
N. S. Fin. Corp. v. Al-Turki, 100 F.3d 1046, 1051 (2d Cir. 1996).
See, e.g., Jose v. M/V Fir Grove, 801 F. Supp. 349, 357 (D. Or. 1991) ("[T]he
104.
language and legislative history of RICO fail to demonstrate clear Congressional intent
to apply the statutes beyond U.S. boundaries.").
See, e.g., Poulos v. Caesars World, Inc., 379 F.3d 654, 663-64 (9th Cir.
105.
2004) (listing several cases that have applied the conducts and effects test); Al-Turki,
100 F.3d at 1051 ("Although there is little caselaw in this Circuit regarding the
extraterritorial application of RICO, guidance is furnished by precedents concerning
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this approach, RICO may apply extraterritorially "if conduct material
to the completion of the racketeering occurs in the United States, or if
significant effects of the racketeering are felt [in the United
States]."106

As stated, these legal principles beg the underlying question of
what exactly constitutes "extraterritorial application." In other words,
how do courts determine when a plaintiff is seeking to apply RICO
extraterritorially, rather than domestically? Arguably, the conduct
and effects test actually works to distinguish between extraterritorial
and domestic application, rather than operating to classify different
cases of extraterritorial application,10 7 but there does not appear to be
a clearly or consistently articulated answer as to what exactly
constitutes "extraterritorial application" in the pre-Morrison RICO

jurisprudence. 0 8
For almost two decades after RICO's enactment, courts failed to
articulate any analytical framework regarding RICO's extraterritorial
applicability. 109 The Second Circuit did hold, however, in Alfadda v.
Fenn, that "the mere fact that the corporate defendants are foreign
entities does not immunize them from the reach of RICO.""10 At least
one commentator argued that courts should treat RICO like § 10(b)
and apply the statute extraterritorially in certain circumstances
because of the similarities between the purposes and judicial
interpretations of RICO and federal securities laws."'
Beginning with the Second Circuit in 1996, federal courts began
to develop modes of analysis for determining whether a particular
case involved the extraterritorial application of RICO.11 2 The Second
Circuit first established a test for determining the extraterritorial

subject matter jurisdiction for international securities transactions and antitrust
matters.").
106.
Liquidation Comm'n of Banco Intercont'l, S.A. v. Alvarez Renta, 530 F.3d
1339, 1351-52 (11th Cir. 2008).
107.
Regardless of how one conceptualizes the conduct and effects test, the
problem of identifying "extraterritorial application" (vis-A-vis domestic application)
must be the primary inquiry, especially in light of Morrison's strict holding that
statutes have no extraterritorial application in the absence of an express legislative
statement. Morrison v. Nat'1 Austi. Bank, 130. S. Ct. 2869, 2878 (2010).
See Alvarez Renta, 530 F.3d at 1351-52 (phrasing the question presented
108.
as whether RICO applies "to conduct occurring outside the United States," but holding
that RICO applied "extraterritorially" because "significant amounts of conduct in
furtherance of the RICO conspiracy occurred in . . . the United States . . . ."); Al-Turki,
100 F.3d at 1051 (suggesting that "extraterritorial application" of RICO means the
application of the statute against "foreign entit[ies]").
See Al-Turki, 100 F.3d at 1051 (recognizing, seventeen years after RICO's
109.
enactment, that there was "little caselaw in this Circuit regarding the extraterritorial
application of RICO").
Alfadda v. Fenn, 935 F.2d 475, 479 (2d Cir. 1991).
110.
Kristen Neller, Extraterritorial Application of RICO: Protecting U.S.
111.
Markets in a Global Economy, 14 MICH. J. INT'L L. 357, 377-78, 380 (1993).
See Al-Turki, 100 F.3d at 1051 (borrowing the conduct and effects tests
112.
from transnational securities fraud jurisprudence).
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application of RICO in North South Finance Corp. v. Al-Turki.113 The
controversy in Al-Turki revolved around the sale of a French bank.114
The foreign holding companies that previously owned, and eventually
sold, the bank alleged RICO violations by two French investment
banking groups that acquired the bank. 115 The allegations were
essentially that the acquirers:
(1) artificially depressed the sale price of SEB by corrupting the bank's
general manager in Paris, who then understated the bank's liquidity for
financial and regulatory purposes and misused information drawn from
company sources (including a New York office); and
(2) manipulated post-sale transactions (some of them executed in New
York) so that contingent payments of the purchase price would be
11 6
fraudulently reduced or eliminated.

Among the specific allegations was the claim that some of the
communications between the acquirers and the bank's general
manager occurred by telephone from France to New York.11 7
The Second Circuit affirmed the lower court's finding that the
plaintiffs' allegations did not support subject matter jurisdiction
under RICO.s18 To determine the extraterritorial reach of RICO in
this case, the district court asked "whether the conduct of the
defendants in the United States was material to the completion of a
racketeering act." 1 9 Neither party challenged this conduct test on
appeal, and the Second Circuit affirmed its validity.120 However, the
court explicitly left open the possibility that other tests might be
available.121

As recently as 2008, the Eleventh Circuit confronted the issue of
extraterritorial application of RICO for the first time in Liquidation
Commission of Banco Intercontinental SA v. Renta. 122 The court
surveyed the case law that had developed in other circuits before
adopting the "more widely accepted view .

.

. that RICO may apply

extraterritorially if conduct material to the completion of the
racketeering occurs in the United States, or if significant effects of
23
the racketeering are felt here."1

113.
Id.
114.
Id. at 1048.
115.
Id.
116.
Id.
Id. at 1049.
117.
118.
Id. at 1050.
119.
Id. at 1048 (internal quotation marks omitted).
120.
Id. at 1050.
Id. at 1052.
121.
122.
Liquidation Comm'n of Banco Intercont'l, S.A. v. Renta, 530 F.3d 1339,
1351 (2008). ("The first question ... is whether RICO applies extraterritorially at all.").
123.
Id. at 1351-52.
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Renta primarily involved an allegedly fraudulent scheme in
which the defendant (Renta) negotiated with a Dominican bankl 24 to
take out loans on behalf of corporations that were controlled by the
defendant and subsequently transferred those funds to himself in a
personal capacity, leaving the debtor corporations unable to repay the
loans. 125 The parties disputed whether these transfers were
fraudulent, or whether they were in essence repayments to the
defendant for loans that he had made to the companies that he
controlled.126 A jury found for the Commission, and Renta appealed a
$177 million judgment. 2 7
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit held that RICO applied in this
case because "[slignificant amounts of conduct in furtherance of the
RICO conspiracy occurred in both the United States as well as the
Dominican Republic."128 Specifically, the court determined that "the
conduct occurring in, or directed at, the United States . . . was not an

insubstantial or preparatory part of the overall looting scheme, but
the actual means of its consummation."2 s
However, notwithstanding its willingness to apply RICO in this
case, the court made a point of noting that "the conduct test is
borrowed from the securities laws" and that "American courts will not
exercise jurisdiction over a transnational securities fraud suit if the
conduct occurring in the United States is preparatory or far removed
from the consummation of the fraud."' 3 0 The court extrapolated that
principle of securities law jurisprudence to the RICO context:
Likewise, extraterritorial RICO jurisdiction may not be appropriate
when conduct occurring in or directed at the United States is not
central to consummation of the racketeering, for example, where the
sole nexus is utilization of American mail or wires to prepare for or
cover up a fraud scheme perpetrated by foreigners against other
foreigners.131

C. Extraterritorialityand RICO: Post-MorrisonJurisprudence
The Supreme Court's decision in Morrison is sure to shake up
this jurisprudence that the lower courts had developed in the context
of the extraterritorial application of RICO. Only two months after the
Supreme Court handed down the Morrison decision, the federal

124.
The bank had collapsed prior to the litigation, and the plaintiff (the
Commission) in this litigation was a receivership established by the Dominican
government to manage the bank's affairs. Id. at 1343.
125.
Id. at 1344-46.
126.
Id. at 1347-49.
127.
Id. at 1343.
128.
Id. at 1352.
Id.
129.
130.
Id.
Id. (citing N. S. Fin. Corp. v. Al-Turki, 100 F.3d 1046, 1052-53 (2d Cir.
131.
1996)).
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district court for the Southern District of New York issued an opinion
in Cederto v. Intech Group, Inc. that applied Morrison in the RICO
context. 132 In Cederlo, the defendants were foreign entities; their only
connection to the United States was their alleged use of U.S. banks to
"hold, move and conceal the fruits of fraud, extortion, and private
abuse of public authority by Venezuelan government officials and
their confederates .
Implicitly recognizing that Morrison abrogated the contrary
holding in Alfadda v. Fenn,13 4 the court held that in the absence of
any specific statutory mention of "foreign enterprises," the
presumption against extraterritoriality dictated that RICO did not
apply to foreign enterprises.1 35 Specifically, the court interpreted the
RICO statute as focusing not on prohibiting criminal activity, but
rather on the relationship between that activity and an enterprise.
RICO is not a recidivist statute designed to punish someone for
committing a pattern of multiple criminal acts. Rather, it prohibits the
use of such a pattern to impact an enterprise in any of three ways: by
using the proceeds of a pattern of predicate acts to invest in an
enterprise; by . . . using a pattern of predicate acts to obtain or
maintain an interest in an enterprise; or by . . . using the enterprise
itself as a conduit for committing a pattern of predicate acts. Thus, the
focus of RICO is on the enterprise as the recipient of, or cover for, a
1 36
pattern of criminal activity.

One month after the Cederto decision, the Second Circuit became
the first appellate court to revisit the issue of extraterritorial
application of RICO in light of Morrison in Norex Petroleum Ltd. v.
Access Industries, Inc.1 37 Norex Petroleum, a Canadian corporation,
alleged violations of RICO in connection with "a widespread
racketeering and money laundering scheme whose principal purpose
[was] to take over a substantial portion of the Russian oil
industry." 138 Essentially, Norex claimed that the defendants
orchestrated a scheme to illegally seize control of a Russian oil
company in which Norex had owned a controlling stake, to illegally
divert oil flows from companies that had outstanding oil debts to
Norex, and to launder illegally diverted oil profits and to accomplish a
"massive United States, United Kingdom, and Russian tax fraud
through offshore 'Slush Fund' arrangements." 139 The allegations

132.
Cedefio v. Intech Grp., Inc., 733 F. Supp. 2d 471, 473-74 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
133.
Id. at 472 (internal quotation marks omitted).
134.
See infra note 166.
135.
Cedehio, 733 F. Supp. 2d at 473.
136.
Id. at 473-74 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)-(c) (2006)).
137.
Norex Petrol. Ltd. v. Access Indus., Inc., 631 F.3d 29, 32-33 (2d Cir. 2010)
(per curiam).
138.
Norex Petrol. Ltd. v. Access Indus., Inc., 304 F. Supp. 2d 570, 572 (S.D.N.Y.
2004).
139.
Id. at 573.
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consisted largely of corruption and bribery of Russian government
officials and judicial proceedings. 140
The Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Norex's RICO
claim.1 41 Without offering much guidance as to what might constitute
domestic application, the court held that "simply alleging that some
domestic conduct occurred cannot support a claim of domestic
application."142 The court found that the "slim contacts with the

United States" alleged in Norex were "insufficient to support
extraterritorial application of the RICO statute." 43
In the months following the Norex decision, several more federal
district courts have addressed the problem of RICO's extraterritorial
reach in light of Morrison. In European Community v. RJR Nabisco,
Inc., the district court for the Eastern District of New York embraced
Cedeilo's holding that RICO's focus is on the enterprise and dismissed
the plaintiffs' RICO claims for the stated reason that they were
extraterritorial in nature,144 although in reality, the court's reasoning
was much more convoluted. 145 The district court in United States v.

140.
Id. at 572-75.
Although the Second Circuit affirmed, it was on different grounds than the
141.
district court because Morrison dictated that the extraterritoriality inquiry was a
merits question, rather than a jurisdictional question. See Morrison v. Austl. Nat'1
Bank, 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2876 (2010); Norex, 631 F.3d 29 at 32-33.
142.
Norex, 631 F.3d at 33 (emphasis added).
143.
Id. Of course, the court's rather imprecise language somewhat confuses the
issue. Under Morrison, no amount of contacts with the United States could be
"sufficient to support extraterritorial application" of RICO; only a statutory mandate
could support extraterritorial application. See generally Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 288385 ("We know of no one who thought that the Act was intended to regulat[e] foreign
securities exchanges-or indeed who even believed that under established principles of
international law Congress had the power to do so." (alteration in original) (quoting in
part 15 U.S.C. § 78(a) (2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Presumably, the
Second Circuit here means to say that the slim contacts with the United States in this
case were insufficient to characterize this claim as seeking only domestic application of
RICO.
144.
European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., No. 02-CV-5771 (NGG) (VVP), 2011
WL 843957, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2011) (holding that extraterritorial application of
RICO is prohibited).
145.
After concluding that the enterprise was the focus of RICO, the court stated
that it must apply the "nerve center" test to determine the location of the enterprise.
Id. at *4-6. "The nerve center test 'identif[ies] the place where overall corporate policy
originates or the nerve center from which it radiates out to its constituent parts and
from which its officers direct, control and coordinate all activities without regard to
locale, in the furtherance of the corporate objectives."' Id. at *6 (quoting Royal Indem.
Co. v. Wyckoff Heights Hosp., 953 F. Supp. 460, 462-63 (E.D.N.Y. 1996)). The court
then determined that the nerve center of the RICO enterprise alleged by the plaintiffs
actually consisted of foreign entities other than the defendants in the litigation. Id. at
*7. In other words, the court determined that the domestic defendants did not have
RICO liability because even if they were complicit in RICO violations, they were not
responsible for masterminding the entire scheme. Essentially, the court treated all of
the enterprises engaged in different transactions alleged by the plaintiffs as one
collective "enterprise," determined that its "corporate policy" originated overseas with
groups other than the defendants, and so reached the bizarre twin conclusions that
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Philip Morris USA, Inc. reversed both itself and the D.C. Circuit upon
reconsideration but held only that the effects test was no longer good
law after Morrison.146 In In re Toyota Motor Corp., the District Court
for the Central District of California suggested that the domestic
nature of the defendant enterprise is necessary, but not necessarily
sufficient, to establish RICO liability.' 47 In In re Le-Nature's, Inc., the
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania followed
Cedeiho, holding that a domestic enterprise was subject to RICO
liability because the focus of RICO was on the enterprise.148 However,
the court in Le-Nature's went out of its way to state that it had no
occasion in this case to opine as to whether the defendants' conduct or
effects alone would have been sufficient to subject them to RICO
liability if the enterprise involved had not been domestic, or as to the
treatment of "associated-in-fact" (i.e., not legally organized)
enterprises.' 49 In other words, the court acknowledged that the facts
in Le-Nature's were relatively straightforward and clarified that its
opinion was not intended to address a more controversial fact
pattern.
IV. ANALYZING THE POST-MORRIsoN RICO JURISPRUDENCE

After Morrison v. National Australia Bank, the former
foundational principles regarding extraterritoriality in the securities
law context-i.e., the conduct and effects tests-have been replaced
with a purely transactional analysis.15 0 In light of this seismic shift in
§ 10(b) jurisprudence, courts are now faced with re-examining its
copycat body of law, RICO. Two of Morrison's holdings appear
(1) that the
applicable in the RICO context-namely,
extraterritoriality inquiry is a merits question rather than a
jurisdictional question, 1s1 and (2) that a statute does not apply
extraterritorially in the absence of a clear legislative statement to
that effect.xs 2 The critical issue, however, involves the very definition
of extraterritorial application.

RICO applies to domestic enterprises but that the domestic enterprises sued in this
case were not subject to RICO liability. Id. at *7-8.
146.
United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., No. 99-2496 (GK), 2011 WL
1252662, at *5 (D.D.C. Mar. 28, 2011).
147.
In re Toyota Motor Corp. Unintended Acceleration Mktg., Sales Practices &
Products Liab. Litig., No. 8:10ML 02151 JVS (FMOx), 2011 WL 1485479, at *17-18
(C.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2011).
148.
Farm Credit Leasing Servs. Corp. v. Krones, Inc. (In re Le-Nature's, Inc.),
No. 9-MC-162, 2011 WL 2112533, at *3 n.9 (W.D. Pa. May 26, 2011).
149.
Id.
150.
See Morrison v. Nat'1 Austl. Bank, 130. S. Ct. 2869, 2888 (2010) (Stevens,
J., concurring) (noting that many courts had previously applied the effects test).
151.
Id. at 2877.
152.
Id.
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There are at least three alternative tests that courts could invoke
to define extraterritoriality under RICO in the wake of Morrison.
First, courts could follow the Cedeio approach, which seems to be
that RICO applies only to U.S. enterprises.1 53 Second, courts could
adopt the quasi-jurisdictional "contacts" approach employed by the
Second Circuit in Norex.154 A third approach could be to focus on a
complete, but possibly subsidiary, pattern of racketeering activity in
the United States. No court has yet taken this view, but this Note
explores and ultimately endorses this third approach.

A. The Domestic EnterprisesApproach of Cedefio
The first alternative for defining extraterritoriality in the RICO
context is that endorsed by the court in Cedeho v. Intech Group,
Inc.s55 In Cederto, the court zeroed in on language from Morrison that
emphasized the "focus" of the Exchange Act and determined that the
statutory focus of RICO was on the "enterprise" rather than on the
pattern of racketeering activity. 156 Because the court viewed the
statute to be principally concerned with the enterprise, rather than
the criminal conduct itself, the court found it dispositive that the
RICO statute does not explicitly mention foreign enterprises.' 5 7 In
the absence of such statutory language, the court held that RICO did
not apply to foreign enterprises.15 8 Other courts seem to have taken
this approach as well.' 59
The Cederlo court's reasoning is not beyond challenge, however.
First, the Cedeiro opinion assumes that the Second Circuit case of
Alfadda v. Fenn is no longer good law in light of Morrison.16 0 In
Alfadda, the plaintiffs alleged that they were "defrauded when their
stake in [defendant Saudi European Investment Corporation N.V.
(SEIC)] was diluted by sales in contravention of an offering
prospectus." 161 SEIC was a foreign corporation, but the two
individual defendants were U.S. citizens.162 The allegedly misleading

153.
See Cedefio v. Intech Grp., Inc., 733 F. Supp. 2d 471, 473 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)
("[N]owhere does the statute evidence any concern with foreign enterprises, let alone a
concern sufficiently clear to overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality.").
154.
See Norex Petrol. Ltd. v. Access Indus., Inc., 631 F.3d 29, 33 (2d Cir. 2010)
(per curiam) (holding that "simply alleging that some domestic conduct occurred cannot
support a claim of domestic application" and noting "[t]he slim contacts with the
United States" alleged in Norex).
Cedeiho, 733 F. Supp. 2d at 471.
155.
Id. at 473-74.
156.
157.
Id. at 474.
158.
Id.
159.
See, e.g., European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., No. 02-CV-5771 (NGG)
(VVP), 2011 WL 843957, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2011) (holding that extraterritorial
application of RICO is prohibited).
160.
Cederlo, 733 F. Supp. 2d at 474 n.3.
161.
Alfadda v. Fenn, 935 F.2d 475, 476 (2d Cir. 1991).
162.
Id.
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prospectus was distributed outside the United States, and the
securities offerings were made outside the United States. 16 3 However,
much of the planning and negotiating leading up to the second
offering occurred in the United States.16 4 In Alfadda, the Second
Circuit applied RICO and held that "[t]he mere fact that the
corporate defendants are foreign entities does not immunize them
from the reach of RICO."165
The Cedeho court acknowledged the Alfadda case in a footnote,
but dismissed it as "exactly the kind [of approach] that Morrison
found to impermissibly 'disregard . . . the presumption against

extraterritoriality."1 66 While that claim arguably has some merit, it
is not altogether clear that Alfadda is now bad law. The reason for
discounting Alfadda as contrary to Morrison is that the Second
Circuit in Alfadda took the lack of an explicit reference to "foreign
enterprise[s]" in the RICO statute to mean that "enterprise," as it is
used in the statute, includes any enterprise, whether foreign or
domestic.' 6 7 The reasoning of the Alfadda court does seem arguably
counter to the holding in Morrison, but the Cedeio court unjustifiably
assumed, without citing any supporting authority, that the question
of extraterritoriality turns simply on whether the defendant
enterprise is foreign or domestic.168
In reality, it is not at all clear that the general domestic or
foreign status of the enterprise is the determinative factor in
classifying a particular case as seeking either domestic or
extraterritorial application.' 69 Cedeho and Le-Nature's both involved
easy fact patterns: in Cedeho, the defendants were indisputably
foreign entities,170 and in Le-Nature's, the defendant entities were
apparently legally organized under domestic law. 171 A more
complicated fact pattern would strain this view of RICO. For
example, it is very plausible that an enterprise organized under
foreign law could orchestrate a racketeering scheme that was

163.
Id. at 477-78.
164.
Id.
165.
Id. at 479.
166.
Cedefio v. Intech Grp., Inc., 733 F. Supp. 2d 471, 474 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
167.
Alfadda, 935 F.2d at 479.
168.
See Cedefio, 733 F. Supp. 2d at 474 ("If, as noted above, RICO evidences no
concern with foreign enterprises, RICO does not apply where, as here, the alleged
enterprise and the impact of the predicate activity upon it are entirely foreign.").
169.
Indeed, prior to Morrison, federal courts looked to the locus of the
racketeering conduct and its effects, rather than whether an enterprise itself was
foreign or domestic in nature. See, e.g., Sec. Exch. Comm'n v. Berger, 322 F.3d 187,
192-93 (2d Cir. 2003).
170.
Cedefto, 733 F. Supp. 2d at 472.
171.
Farm Credit Leasing Servs. Corp. v. Krones, Inc. (In re Le-Nature's, Inc.),
No. 9-MC-162, 2011 WL 2112533, at *3 (W.D. Pa. May 26, 2011). The court implicitly
acknowledged the simplicity of the facts in this case by noting that it was unnecessary
to consider what the outcome would be if the defendant entities were not legally
organized under domestic law. Id.
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conducted entirely within the United States. In such a case, if the
situs of the enterprise (i.e., foreign or domestic) is not determinative,
then while the reasoning in Alfadda may seem contrary to the
Morrison approach, the Alfadda holding would still be good law.
Even if Alfadda is no longer good law, the Cedero court still
failed to adequately consider existing RICO jurisprudence. The court
based its decision upon a determination that RICO "is focused on how
a pattern of racketeering affects an enterprise" and is not "designed
to punish someone for committing a pattern of multiple criminal
acts."172 However, the Supreme Court has stated that "the heart of
any RICO complaint is the allegation of a pattern of racketeering." 173
Thus, Cederlo seems to be at least partially inconsistent with a
statement by the Supreme Court regarding the centrality of the
pattern requirement.
Indeed it is silliness to assert that the "enterprise" element is
any more important to a RICO claim than the "pattern of
racketeering activity" element. In citing the statute's name (i.e., the
Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act) to support
such a position, the Cederlo and Le-Nature's courts apparently glossed
over the first word of the RICO acronym in eager determination to
focus on the last.1 74 Although both are fundamental elements of a
RICO claim, RICO chiefly punishes patterns of racketeering activity,
not the conducting of an enterprise. This is a statute that was
originally enacted to target organized crime, not just any organized
activity. The case law, which heavily focuses on defining a "pattern of
racketeering activity,"1 75 bears out this emphasis, and the Supreme
Court itself has held that the "pattern of racketeering activity"
76
element is the "heart" of RICO.1
In addition to the doctrinal problems posed by the Cedeio
approach, there is also a significant practical difficulty-namely,
determining whether a particular enterprise is foreign or a domestic.
In Cedeuio, there was nothing difficult about classifying the defendant
enterprise as foreign. 177 Similarly, in Le-Nature's, there was no
dispute that the defendant enterprises were domestic. 17 8 However,
every case is not so easy. Because "enterprise" is so liberally defined
in the RICO statute, it is all but inevitable that some "enterprises"

Cedeiho, 733 F. Supp. 2d at 473.
172.
Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 154
173.
(1987) (per curiam).
Cedeio, 733 F. Supp. 2d at 473; In re Le-Nature's, 2011 WL 2112533, at *3.
174.
See Kauthar SDN BHD v. Sternberg, 149 F.3d 659, 662 (7th Cir. 1998)
175.
('The court dismissed all of the RICO claims on the grounds that Kauthar failed to
allege satisfactorily the requisite predicate acts, failed to allege a pattern of
racketeering activity and failed to allege other essential elements of individual RICO
claims under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)-(d).").
Agency Holding Corp., 483 U.S. at 154.
176.
Cedehlo, 733 F. Supp. 2d at 472.
177.
In re Le-Nature's, 2011 WL 2112533, at *3.
178.
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sued under RICO will lack any form of official organization at all. If a
court were presented with a multinational group of individuals,
operating in several different countries including the United States,
the seemingly straightforward rule of Cedehio would suddenly be
much more complicated because it would be necessary somehow to
classify this informal enterprise as either foreign or domestic. 7 9
The RJR Nabisco court attempted to resolve this difficulty by
invoking the "nerve center" test, but identifying an enterprise as
either foreign or domestic is still only one step in the Cedehio analysis.
It strains credulity to argue that Congress intended RICO to target
an informal enterprise that does much of its planning in the United
States but operates entirely overseas, but did not intend it to apply to
an informal enterprise that does its planning overseas but conducts
all of its racketeering activities in the United States.
B. The "Contacts"Approach of Norex
Another possible way to address problems of extraterritorial
application of RICO is through the quasi-jurisdictional framework
adopted by the Second Circuit in Norex Petroleum Ltd. v. Access
Industries,Inc.o8 0 The court in Norex seemed to engage in an analysis
of the contacts between the conduct alleged in the complaint and the
United States. 18 1 This test appears to be a carryover from the conduct
and effects tests that the Second Circuit had used prior to Morrison.
Indeed, the court in Norex even reverted to pre-Morrisonlanguage in
stating that "[t]he slim contacts with the United States alleged by
Norex are insufficient to support extraterritorial application of the
RICO statute." 182 Of course, Morrison made clear that no amount of
contacts could support extraterritorial application of RICO (or any
other statute), but only an express statement by Congress.18 3 This
statement in Norex looks like an attempt by the Second Circuit to
reconcile Morrison with its pre-existing, jurisdiction-focused conduct
test jurisprudence.
The conduct test, as it existed prior to Morrison, supported
federal jurisdiction over a RICO claim when the defendant's activities
in the United States were more than "merely preparatory" to a
racketeering scheme conducted elsewhere, and these activities or
culpable failures to act within the United States "directly caused" the

179.
Cf. id. at *3 n.9 ("Although I recognize the problems that might arise in
different RICO contexts, I do not opine as to how today's findings apply to an
associated-in-fact enterprise, which might not have a distinct "location" as does an
enterprise that is a legal entity.").
180.
Norex Petrol. Ltd. v. Access Indus., Inc., 631 F.3d 29, 32-33 (2d Cir. 2010)
(per curiam).
181.
Id. at 33.
Id.
182.
Id.
183.
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claimed losses. 184 While perhaps walking back from this precise
formulation in light of Morrison, the Second Circuit in Norex
nonetheless sounded less than revolutionary in declaring that "simply
alleging that some domestic conduct occurred cannot support a claim
of domestic application" and noting the "slim contacts with the United
States alleged by Norex."' 5
The Second Circuit may indeed be right if the Norex opinion
intended to suggest that Morrison may not necessarily compel the
conclusion that the conduct test cannot be used to determine the
applicability of RICO. The primary requirement of Morrison seems to
be that the inquiry be framed in terms of whether the application of
the statute sought by the plaintiff is domestic or extraterritorial in
nature, not necessarily that courts refrain from employing the
conduct test. 86 Because there can be no extraterritorial application of
87
a statute without an explicit congressional statement to that effect,'
the only question that needs to be answered in the RICO context is
whether the court is dealing with a garden-variety domestic
application, or whether the plaintiff is seeking to apply the statute
extraterritorially.
One must consider, then, whether the Second Circuit's new
contacts-conduct test from Norex is the best way to delineate the
boundaries of domestic application. The crux of the Second Circuit's
approach in Norex appears to be determining whether the primary
racketeering scheme-or at least enough of it-was carried out in
U.S. territory. 188 One problem with this formulation is that it
answers the original question only to create another questionnamely, how is a court to determine what quantum of conduct in the
United States is enough? Norex tells us that "some" contacts with the
United States-in this case, routing (or laundering) money through
U.S. banks' 8 -are not enough,19 0 but this case hardly offers much

184.
See Itoba Ltd. v. LEP Grp. PLC, 54 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing
Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 987 (2d Cir. 1975)); Alfadda v. Fenn, 935
F.2d 475, 478 (2d Cir. 1991)) (reversing the district court's dismissal for lack subject
matter jurisdiction where the defendant company's misleading securities filings were
more than merely preparatory and were the cause of significant equity losses for
American shareholders in the defrauded company). For a discussion of the ambiguity
and complexity existing in the "conduct test" jurisprudence, see Morrison v. Nat'l Austl.
Bank, 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2879 (2010) ("The Second Circuit had thus established that
application of § 10(b) could be premised upon either some effect on American securities
markets or investors (Schoenbaum) or significant conduct in the United States
(Leasco).").
185.
Norex, 631 F.3d at 33.
Id.
186.
187.
Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877-78.
188.
Id. at 2878.
189.
See Norex, 631 F.3d at 33 (holding that some domestic conduct is not
enough to justify application of RICO).
190.
Norex Petrol. Ltd. v. Access Indus., Inc., 304 F. Supp. 2d 570, 572-75
(S.D.N.Y. 2004).
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guidance beyond its own facts. Of course, the Norex approach creates
neither more nor less uncertainty than the pre-Morrison conduct test
because it is, after all, essentially the same inquiry rebranded.
Arguably, the Cederlo and Norex approaches are not inconsistent
with one another; at least one commenting practitioner has asserted
that the Second Circuit actually endorsed the Cedeho decision in
Norex.191 But while the decisions may not contradict one another,
they nonetheless appear to have been decided on different grounds.
The court in Cedeho emphasized that the defendant enterprise was a
"foreign enterprise," to which the RICO state statute did not apply. 192
The Second Circuit could have followed that same reasoning in
Norex-although there was perhaps a better argument that this case
involved a domestic enterprise19 3-but the court instead pointed to
the tangential relationship between the racketeering scheme and the
United States as the basis for its determination that RICO did not
apply.194
V. A BETTER ALTERNATIVE
A. The Need for a Third Alternative
In the search for a standard by which to determine whether a
particular application of RICO would be domestic or extraterritorial,
both the Cedeho and Norex approaches fall short. The Cedeho
approach is saddled with doctrinal and practical complications.1 95
The Cedeho court focused almost exclusively on the enterprise
involved in RICO allegations, a narrow focus that is not supported by
existing case law.' 96 The Norex approach fails to adequately answer
the question that Morrison sparked in the RICO context. 9 7 Phrased
in language that is clearly contrary to the holding in Morrison, the
Norex court's quasi-jurisdictional formulation fails to offer
satisfactory guidance as to when RICO allegations are domestic in
nature rather than extraterritorial.19 8

191.
Norex, 631 F.3d at 33.
192.
See Jonathan C. Cross, RICO's Post-Morrison' Reach: Will Other Courts
Adopt the 2nd Circuit's Approach?, LAW.COM (Nov. 12, 2010), http://www.1aw.com/
jsp/article.jsp?id=1202474772016.
193.
Cedefio v. Intech Grp., Inc., 733 F. Supp. 2d 471, 472 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
194.
Norex, 631 F.3d at 33.
195.
See supraPart IV.A.
196.
See supraPart IV.A.
197.
See supraPart IV.B.
198.
Id.
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B. A Complete Pattern of RacketeeringActivity in the United States
A third, better alternative to delineating the scope of domestic
application of RICO would be to apply RICO in any case where a
plaintiff alleges the commission of enough predicate acts in the
United States within the statutory time period to establish a "pattern
of racketeering activity," even if the "enterprise" is a foreign
enterprise or the scheme involves the commission of predicate acts in
a foreign jurisdiction. This approach would require a paradigm shift
from viewing any given racketeering scheme as essentially one
specific "pattern of racketeering activity," to viewing every
racketeering scheme as a consisting of potentially numerous patterns
of racketeering activity in multiple jurisdictions.
In borrowing the extraterritoriality jurisprudence from the
securities law context, courts have tended to view the "pattern of
racketeering activity" requirement of RICO 199 similarly to the
"purchase or sale" requirement of § 10(b). 200 This tendency has
resulted in courts trying to fit the square peg of RICO jurisprudence
into the round hole of securities law jurisprudence. While a securities
fraud claim, no matter how elaborate, is centered around a single
purchase or sale of a security, the "heart" of a RICO claim is "the
allegation of a pattern of racketeering activity."20 1 This fundamental
difference manifests itself in the challenge of defining the boundaries
of domestic application of each statute.
In the § 10(b) context, the Supreme Court has identified a
straightforward method of determining whether a particular plaintiff
is seeking domestic or extraterritorial application of the statute.20 2
Under Morrison's transactional test, the court need only inquire
whether the stock in question was traded on domestic exchanges or
otherwise purchased in the United States. 2 03 But there is no such
single transaction to which a court can sensibly anchor an entire
"pattern of racketeering activity." As the Court held in H.J., the
pattern requirement is a flexible concept that essentially requires

See 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (2006) (defining a "pattern of racketeering activity" as
199.
requiring "at least two acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred after the
effective date of this chapter and the last of which occurred within ten years (excluding
any period of imprisonment) after the commission of a prior act of racketeering
activity").
See 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2006) (prohibiting fraud "in connection with the
200.
purchase or sale of any security").
Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 154
201.
(1987).
See Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank, 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2888 (2010) ("Section
202.
10(b) reaches the use of a manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance only in
connection with the purchase or sale of a security listed on an American stock
exchange, and the purchase or sale of any other security in the United States.").
203.
Id.
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only that a plaintiff demonstrate either past, continued criminal
activity or criminal activity that threatens to become "continuous."20 4
Using this third approach to determine what constitutes
extraterritorial application of RICO, courts would move away from
the view of racketeering activity as necessarily a single, broad-based
scheme and instead focus on the statutory proscription of specific
predicate crimes. The result would be an analysis that simply looks to
identify continued criminal activity, or ongoing criminal activity with
the threat of becoming continuous, undertaken in connection with the
conduct of an enterprise and consisting of at least two acts of
racketeering activity within a ten-year time period. 205 A court
utilizing this approach would not engage in an inquiry into whether a
particular enterprise was foreign or domestic, or how significant any
acts occurring in the United States were to the overall racketeering
scheme. An enterprise based overseas and committing a pattern of
racketeering activity that primarily occurred overseas could therefore
still have liability under RICO if it or an affiliate engaged in a course
of continuous criminal conduct involving at least two violations
enumerated in the statute 20 6 in U.S. territory.
The third approach is faithful to both the RICO statute and to
the holding in Morrison. In fact, this approach is actually more
consistent with a description of Morrison's holding in the Cedeiio
opinion than the rest of the Cedeiho opinion itself is. According to the
Cedeio court, Morrison clarified that the statutory language defining
"interstate commerce" as including activities between any foreign
country and any state "was only intended to catch situations where,
for example, a foreign person perpetrated a fraud in the United
States."20 7 This third approach is also consistent with the spirit of the
Second Circuit's Norex decision, but this alternative view offers a
more doctrinally sound and practically useful framework for
evaluating whether an alleged RICO violation is domestic or
extraterritorial. This third approach treats the extraterritoriality
issue as more of a merits question, as Morrison requires, and less like
a preliminary quasi-jurisdictional issue. Instead of framing the
inquiry as whether the defendant has "sufficient contacts" with the
U.S. to be subject to RICO liability, this approach would simply
examine whether the defendant has in fact engaged domestically in a
pattern of racketeering in connection with carrying on an enterprise.
One criticism of this third approach may be that it does not offer
specific guidance for a borderline case in which a defendant has
allegedly engaged in a course of criminal conduct that spans multiple

204.
H.J., Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 238, 241-42 (1989).
205.
For a list of the enumerated predicate crimes, see 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (2006).
206.
See supra note 199.
207.
Cedefio v. Intech Grp., Inc., 733 F. Supp. 2d 471, 473 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (citing
Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2882 & n.7).
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jurisdictions. However, neither the Cedeiho approach nor the Norex
approach can claim any greater clarity. Cedeiho provides clarity only
as long as the enterprise can be easily classified as either domestic or
foreign; Norex employs a typical case-by-case analysis of the contacts
that a particular RICO defendant or scheme has to the United States.
It is true that this Note also endorses a "flexible approach," but in
reality, this third approach involves no more flexibility than that
inherent in the "pattern" analysis that the Court adopted in H.J. In
other words, this approach does not add any additional uncertainty to
the existing RICO analysis in a case not involving extraterritoriality.
In light of the handful of cases decided since Morrison, perhaps
the strongest criticism of this approach is that it focuses too heavily
on the "pattern of racketeering activity" element, and wrongly
deemphasizes the "enterprise" element, in the RICO analysis. While
the structure of the statutory language could arguably lend some
credence to the argument that the enterprise is the "focus" of
RICO, 208 such a position is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's
acknowledgement that the "pattern of racketeering activity" element
is central to the prohibitions of RICO. 209 Furthermore, common sense
suggests that Congress intended RICO to apply to a generally foreign
enterprise that engaged in racketeering activity in the United States.
VI. CONCLUSION

In the wake of Morrison, lower courts will be forced to reexamine
the previously settled approach to extraterritoriality and RICO. The
RICO jurisprudence, which had so closely tracked the doctrinal
development of securities law jurisprudence for so many years, must
now diverge from the § 10(b) framework, at least for purposes of
drawing the line between domestic and extraterritorial application.
Two courts have offered different takes on the implications of
Morrison in the RICO context. The U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York has embraced the theory that the line
between domestic and extraterritorial application of RICO should be
drawn based on whether the enterprise involved is foreign or
domestic. 210 The Second Circuit has appeared to advocate a contacts-

The statute chiefly prohibits (1) using any income derived from a pattern of
208.
racketeering activity to invest in any enterprise engaged in, or affecting, interstate or
foreign commerce; (2) acquiring, through a pattern of racketeering activity, any
interest in any enterprise engaged in, or affecting, interstate or foreign commerce; and
(3) participating, through a pattern of racketeering activity, in the conduct of the
affairs of any enterprise engaged in, or affecting, interstate or foreign commerce. 18
U.S.C. § 1962 (2006).
Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 154
209.
(1987).
Cedeiho, 733 F. Supp. 2d at 474.
210.
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based, quasi-jurisdictional test to determine whether a particular
case involves sufficient contacts with the United States to invoke
RICO. 211
This Note advocates a third approach that would adhere more
closely to the statutory language and more faithfully to existing case
law. RICO should have domestic application when a plaintiff alleges
the commission of enough predicate acts in the United States within
the statutory time period to establish a "pattern of racketeering
activity," regardless of the situs of the enterprise or the commission of
additional predicate acts in a foreign jurisdiction. This approach
represents the best way to reconcile prior RICO jurisprudence with
the Court's renewed emphasis on the presumption against
extraterritorial application of U.S. laws in Morrison.
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